No Theory in Magic

[Rayn]

My post is off topic, but you've made me curious. I'd be interested in hearing your reasons (maybe in another thread) as to why you think there can be no theory for magic.

I am pretty busy with my life, right now, but when I have time, I plan on writing a blog post that tackles it. I'm going to give a little blurb, until then, though. Pretty much, definitions are tautological in such a way that they give necessary conditions(intensionality) for something to be that thing where extensional members are sufficient to be placed within that set(extensionality). Different paradigms within magic are sufficient; however, they are not necessarily true. This means there exists no deductive proof which means one cannot derive a theorem. There can be no overarching metaphysical theory for magic because issues with the definition of "What is magic?". When people answer this question, they list sufficient things that don't necessarily hold true. If I say that a two-dimensional square has four sides of equal length, then I can deductively prove that a triangle is necessarily not a square. We can't do this with magic, because a tautological definition of it that addresses what is necessary has not been fleshed out. A deductive issues is the problem.

Science does not suffer from this problem, because theories are couched inductively within an unbounded probability space per empirical observations whereas magic is metaphysical, and in being metaphysical, you end up dealing with deduction. Metaphysics says that is an x whereas Science says that is probably an x from what we can currently see but we don't have an exhaustive list of what is necessary for that thing to be an x.

I made my comment to pretty much state I am not going to make a categorical syllogism referring to incubus and succubus because it is not logically possible, so I cannot and will not try to draw up an exhaustive list of the nature of incubus.

For example, a lot of people who practice theurgy take a definition partially derive from the Keys of Solomon:

MAGIC is the Highest, most Absolute, and most Divine Knowledge of Natural Philosophy, 1 advanced in its works and wonderful operations by a right understanding of the inward and occult virtue of things; so that true Agents 2 being applied to proper Patients, 3 strange and admirable effects will thereby be produced. Whence magicians are profound and diligent searchers into Nature; they, because of their skill, know how to anticipate an effort, 4 the which to the vulgar shall seem to be a miracle.

Here is the problem, though. While I can say that is sufficient to be called magic, is it the case that all magic necessarily be this? The answer is no. This isn't to say that this definition is not sufficient, rather, I am saying it is not necessary. A lot of the fighting you see among different magical paradigms has to do with presupposing that their particular tradition is what is required for something to be considered "real magic", but logically, they are simply sufficient; therefore, there is no definition which fits the requirements that allow a theorem to be drawn up in that the intensional aspects of a term bear the connoted aspect of it. In other words, I can give a listing of all the different magical paradigms out there(that is called an extensional definition), however, I could not state what is necessary for those things to be considered magical. I only know when to label these things in a sufficient sense that is pragmatic.

In logic and mathematics, an intensional definition gives the meaning of a term by specifying all the properties required to come to that definition, that is, the necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to the set being defined.

For example, an intensional definition of bachelor is "unmarried man". Being an unmarried man is an essential property of something referred to as a bachelor. It is a necessary condition: one cannot be a bachelor without being an unmarried man. It is also a sufficient condition: any unmarried man is a bachelor.[1]

This is the opposite approach to the extensional definition, which defines by listing everything that falls under that definition – an extensional definition of bachelor would be a listing of all the unmarried men in the world.

Intensional Definiton

[Desecrated]

magic is metaphysical

That is not necessarily correct.
I'm not saying that there aren't some that hold that belief, but there are some that don't.

[Desecrated]

Science does not suffer from this problem, because theories are couched inductively within an unbounded probability space per empirical observations

That's not necessarily true either.

[Rayn]

magic is metaphysical

That is not necessarily correct.
I'm not saying that there aren't some that hold that belief, but there are some that don't.

To say it short and sweet, it says something about things, which is enough to make it metaphysical. These statements, though, are not empirically meaningful statements, so this renders them purely metaphysical. A condition of science is whether or not a hypothesis can be affirmed or denied. This is not a condition of metaphysics. Empirical statements can be said to be metaphysical statements with the condition they can be affirmed or denied based on observation whereas purely metaphysical statements need not that condition. Magic is at least metaphysical for that reason.

Science does not suffer from this problem, because theories are couched inductively within an unbounded probability space per empirical observations

That's not necessarily true either.

I am not sure what you are saying. Scientific hypothesis use inductive reasoning or abductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning is only used in the context of experimentation or theory with the understanding that the theory is probably true without being absolutely true. Science won't say that any theory is 100% true, because that violates a principle of inductive reasoning.

[Desecrated]

To say it short and sweet, it says something about things, which is enough to make it metaphysical. These statements, though, are not empirically meaningful statements, so this renders them purely metaphysical. A condition of science is whether or not a hypothesis can be affirmed or denied. This is not a condition of metaphysics. Empirical statements can be said to be metaphysical statements with the condition they can be affirmed or denied based on observation whereas purely metaphysical statements need not that condition. Magic is at least metaphysical for that reason.

I make a potion.
It's poison. It kills my cat.
I give you the recipe.
You duplicate it.
You give it to your cat.
That cat also dies.

Highly scientific method, still magic.

I tell a funny story
You laugh.

Easiest form of magic. is it Metaphysical? Does it mater?

reasoning

That is the problem. Humans are flawed. Science is a human invention.

[Moth]

I think the best definition of magic is Crowley's:

"the Science and Art of causing Change to occur in conformity with Will"

to which he added "...so this therefore includes tax collecting and potato farming". :-) i.e. magic contains the "magical" as well as the mundane, in a similar metaphor to saying that Relativity contains Newton's Laws.

When people talk about theories of magic, they normally actually talk about models of magic. i.e. a system that helps/allows them to do magic.

For example, the Kaballah is a model of the Universe that you can use in order to perform magical acts. It is a way of accessing the Universe magically. Is it absolutely and literally true? Who knows.

Scientific theories are also models. The difference being is that most of them can be verified objectively against evidence. And if evidence contradicts the model, the model needs to be modified or replaced. (Also true of magical theories)

What I've been working on, is not a scientific theory of magic (because magical theories aren't verifiable in the same way scientific theories are) but a theory of magic which is compatible with our current (very successful) scientific theories.

One of the conclusions I've come to, is that when we do magic, it is an edge condition of normal human consciousness. Almost an exploit, if you will :-)

[Rayn]

When people talk about theories of magic, they normally actually talk about models of magic. i.e. a system that helps/allows them to do magic.

The words theories and models are not interchangeable. A theory, in the purely logical sense, is pretty much a set of statements from which one necessarily follows from the other. A definition creates a set, or category, that connotes what is to be defined. For example, if I said currency, then the extensional members of that set would be things like euros and dollars where it necessarily follows that if it is a dollar, then it is a form of currency. Using the Kabblah to perform magic is sufficient to perform magic, but I don't utilize the Kabblah; therefore, it is not necessary, and because it is not necessary, you cannot come up with a definition that is logically valid based on the Kabblah in that I can point to a different magical practice that is not derived from the Kabblah. I can argue the same for Crowley's definition. I do not abide by that one, either; therefore, it is not necessary. While they work and are sufficient, they are not necessary; therefore, they cannot be used to define magic in such a way that it can be proven via deduction.

I think the best definition of magic is Crowley's:

"the Science and Art of causing Change to occur in conformity with Will"

to which he added "...so this therefore includes tax collecting and potato farming". :-) i.e. magic contains the "magical" as well as the mundane, in a similar metaphor to saying that Relativity contains Newton's Laws.

A lot of the things you mention about Physics aren't quite right and they imply a greater integration than what is current. For example, Relativity does not make it so that Newtonian mechanics doesn't work; rather, there are certain situations where Relativity works better than Newtonian mechanics in terms of physical conditions. The same could be said for Quantum Mechanics. The issue is coming up with an underlying unifying theory that integrates them all which they fall under. In saying one contains another one, you are saying one is a subset of another which implies one can be derived from the other. For example, Newtonian mechanics does not require high-gravitational fields or relativistic speeds, and Relativity introduces new concepts such as relativistic speeds and high gravitational fields that cannot be derived from Newtonian mechanics albeit some laws and structures remain equivalent across the two(such as the first law of motion). The word you are looking for analogous, and, no, Crowley's definition of magic and specified subsets is not like the relationship Newtonian mechanics has to Relativity.

One of the conclusions I've come to, is that when we do magic, it is an edge condition of normal human consciousness. Almost an exploit, if you will :-)

You might be interested in an article I wrote:
Psi Energy

[the_spiral]

This seems like a lot of discussion for a basic question that was resolved by the scientific community in the 1970s with the collapse of the parapsychology field. Magic (however you define that term) can't be hypothesized, let alone theorized, because it is unfalsifiable. We have no tests to prove or disprove the existence of "incubus" or "succubus" thus they remain subjectively defined categories. That doesn't mean they aren't real to the people who encounter them, only that they fall outside the bounds of verifiable phenomena. And the fields do overlap in some areas; for example frankincense, which was burned for spiritual cleansing in magico-religious rites throughout history, was recently found to produce measurably beneficial psychoactive effects.

But I'm getting weary of the obsessive post-Enlightenment Western fetish for empiricizing every single thing to make it fit inside a classical logical-positivist scientific framework. If anything, an ethnographic/anthropological approach would be more appropriate for the study of magic as it can only be reliably evaluated as a social phenomenon thus far.

[Rayn]

This seems like a lot of discussion for a simple question that was resolved by the scientific community during the 1970s with the collapse of the parapsychology field. Magic (however you define that term) can't be hypothesized, let alone theorized, because it is unfalsifiable
.

Being falsifiable is not required of a theory nor is it required of a hypothesis, actually. That is required of scientific theories, but not all theories need be scientific. For example, I can mathematically prove there are no square triangles via deduction where the mathematics used to prove this are not empirical; therefore, it cannot be empirically verified, though, it is true, for geometric proofs are actually deductive. An example of a geometric theorem is pythagorean theorem. What is required of a theory is that it be valid, and valid deductions mean that if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true, because the premise necessarily follows from the premise. The issue with creating a theory of magic is really the issue of defining what about magic is necessary versus merely being sufficient. I am not attempting to argue an empirical issue; rather, I am saying the issue is a logical one. In Boolean logic, categorical syllogisms with universal quantities have no existential import, so I don't have to prove the existence of any incubus if I were to formulate what is necessary for something to be placed within that set per a universal quantity. It does not matter, logically. As I said, the issue is a deductive issue in formulating what is necessary for something to be an incubus. The issue is not one of existential import.

This seems like a lot of discussion for a basic question that was resolved by the scientific community in the 1970s with the collapse of the parapsychology field. Magic (however you define that term) can't be hypothesized, let alone theorized, because it is unfalsifiable.

You are correct. In order for something to be scientific, it has to be testable which is to say what it looks like when proven is different than when it is disproven; however, if it is neither provable or disprovable, it cannot be tested and is thus unscientific; therefore, a scientific conclusion cannot be formulated based upon this. It gets moved into the domain of Philosophy where a philosophical theory can be fleshed out. Furthermore, science happens inductively within an unbounded probability space which is to say there is an infinitesimal chance that something testable could happen, so one should be careful when one makes statements which imply something as being intrinsically not falsifiable, and even if that is the case, this is not to say it lacks metaphysical or epistemological meaning. There are also mathematical issues with frequentest probability models that are utilized to determine if something is testable(such as Bayes Theorem).

[Moth]

The words theories and models are not interchangeable.

That's why I said when people talk about theories, they really mean models.

I think the best definition of magic is Crowley's:

"the Science and Art of causing Change to occur in conformity with Will"

to which he added "...so this therefore includes tax collecting and potato farming". :-) i.e. magic contains the "magical" as well as the mundane, in a similar metaphor to saying that Relativity contains Newton's Laws.

A lot of the things you mention about Physics aren't quite right

It may be that some of your assumptions are incorrect, or I am not explaining myself clearly enough.

and they imply a greater integration than what is current.

That is certainly my plan.

The issue is coming up with an underlying unifying theory that integrates them all which they fall under. In saying one contains another one, you are saying one is a subset of another which implies one can be derived from the other. For example, Newtonian mechanics does not require high-gravitational fields or relativistic speeds, and Relativity introduces new concepts such as relativistic speeds and high gravitational fields that cannot be derived from Newtonian mechanics albeit some laws and structures remain equivalent across the two(such as the first law of motion).

I was under the impression that Relativity can be reduced down to Newton. That is what I meant by "contains". Thus it is possible to ignore any magical aspect to Crowley's statement, and take it at face value as a description of how we interact normally with the world.

The word you are looking for analogous, and, no, Crowley's definition of magic and specified subsets is not like the relationship Newtonian mechanics has to Relativity.

Maybe analogous is the better word, but that's why I said "metaphor".

One of the conclusions I've come to, is that when we do magic, it is an edge condition of normal human consciousness. Almost an exploit, if you will :-)

You might be interested in an article I wrote:
Psi Energy

The article's a bit opaque, but one of the things you appear to be saying is that you're a dualist and a vitalist because no-one's come up with a decent materialist explanation? I'm not sure how that meshes with the detail you talk about physics.

[Rayn]

I was under the impression that Relativity can be reduced down to Newton. That is what I meant by "contains". Thus it is possible to ignore any magical aspect to Crowley's statement, and take it at face value as a description of how we interact normally with the world.

No. I am going to use a simple example here. Say I give you the standard form of a linear equation, which is x+y=1. From this, you can derive slope-intercept form via subtracting x from both sides thus yielding y=-x+1, so I can say that slope-intercept form is derived from standard form. If you want to get more complex, though, take thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. Thermodynamics can be derived from the postulates of statistical mechanics such as the zeoreth law(there are also slight difference in terms of treating one thing as fundamental and the other as derived between the two types of equations and such). As I said, before, Newtonian mechanics does not include the physical conditions that happen with high gravitational fields or relativistic speeds. This means that you cannot account for these things via a derivative from his equations. You end up with new equations. You end up with Einstein field equations that are actually closer in structure to Maxwell's equations. The point is that you can only get from Newton to Einstein if and only if you introduce new physical conditions of which cannot be derived purely from Newtonian mechanics.

You also use the idea of reduction in a weird way. Something is said to be emergent if it behaves differently in a collective way than by itself. For example, by itself, phosolipids might behave one way, but when you expose them to water, they snap into a particular structure that they would not have by itself, so while I can reduce this to the properties of a phosolipid, I kind of have to look at the formation of a membrane from the standpoint of a whole system. You can't really look at a table as a collection of particles and then ignore them because they can be reduced down to those particles, because the emergent thing is interacted with as that thing. If someone hits you over the head with a chair, it will hurt because of an emergent constitutional arrangement of those molecules which makes you get hit over the head with that chair and not just a particle. Statistical mechanics and thermodynamics are just ways to view the system abstractly in such a way that emergent systems can be worked with even though they are comprised of a lot of small parts. Saying something is a subset of a definition of Crowley would be an abstraction that says everything under this is necessated by this definition, BUT it does not address the specifics that could emerge from that basic definition which are dealt with as things. I don't play basketball with apples and eat basketballs as if they were fruits just because they are both round objects due to the emergent properties of these things though they are necessarily round objects. I see this usage in things inspired by Idealism, though, and a lot of mystical schools of thought where the idea is that constituent elements lack discernible identities in such a way that an emergent thing can be ignored for the thing that is more fundamental to them, so if an object is made up of particles, you can deny the object an identity, say it is reduced to those particles, and deal with those particles, but you never see this in science. One reason is because it doesn't even work mathematically, for 1 and 2 are not equal to one another, though, they are subsets of N; therefore, vectors comprised of different numbers will be different though the numbers are subsets of N.

Secondly, the problem with the definition you gave with Crowley is that it is sufficient but not necessary. For example, an idea behind charms versus talismans is that they have intrinsic magical properties that emanate from them. Say if there is a certain stone that is believed to do something. Well, the idea is that it is doing something regardless of if people pick it up and use it. In other words, we have a magical action being carried out by an object that has no will, and since Crowley's definition is contingent on some kind of will, this makes this definition not necessary for that. This isn't to show that it is necessarily wrong; rather, I am showing it is not necessarily true which is kind of my point.

As far as my article goes, I am definitely not a vitalist. Secondly, I am not a dualist, either(there are key philosophical differences), though, I am not a materialist. I linked my article to give you an example of a phenomenological framework since you mention human consciousness. As a person with a background in Genetics who is involved with AI oriented stuff, I kind of can't scientifically believe in vitalism, and I believe that brains produce consciousness. I just don't believe consciousness should be viewed as a statement of identity, or I can't say that a brain is consciousness, but I can state that brains have consciousness. This makes it a thing that something else can have while not being that thing.

[Moth]

To start with, you've completely misread what I said. I said NOT getting from Newton to Einstein, but reducing Einstein down to Newron. I'll reply to the rest when I can read this on something bigger than my phone, since this site is blocked at work.

[Rayn]

To start with, you've completely misread what I said. I said NOT getting from Newton to Einstein, but reducing Einstein down to Newron. I'll reply to the rest when I can read this on something bigger than my phone, since this site is blocked at work.

I did not misread it, for I addressed it. You reduce things down via simplifying them, and when you simplify Einstein equations, you don't get Newtonian equations; therefore, Einstein equations cannot be reduced to Newtonian ones meaning you can't get from Newton to Einstein. To be frank, the conclusion is backwards, because it would imply that Newtonian mechanics is more elegant than Einstein ones, when that is not actually the case. In actuality, Newtonian mechanics created a lot of problems and complications when you expanded the conditions, so it is not more elegant than Eisenstein field equations which would be required if you could reduce/simplify it that way. You can't simply one from the other nor can you derive one from the other; therefore, you can't reduce it down that way.

For example, Einstein is known for his famus e=mc^2, right? Well, that is derived from a Lorentz transformation, Planck's Law, and things like that. The idea of different yet moving reference frames(an important concept in relativity) is tied to Lorentz transformations. Lorentz transformations are actually different than the transformations used in Newtonian mechanics, which are Galilean.

See this for details:
Lorentz and Galilean Transformation

To be honest, I have no clue why you are under the impression that Einstein mechanics is reducible to Newtonian mechanics, because neither the math or the physics can be simplified in that manner. You can't come to this conclusion looking at the theories... Though, to be fair, to get into the nitty gritty of these theories, you have to have a pretty good understanding of the math.

The gist of it is that Physics does not allow for the reduction of Einsteinian mechanics to Newtonian mechanics due to Lorentz Transformations, so you cannot make these statements and they be accurate of Physics, because Newtonian mechanics makes the assumption that everything has the same reference frame in its usage of Galilean transformations whereas Relativity says that is not so in its usage of Lorentz transformations. I am actually curious as to where you got that concept from, though.

Look here at the question under section II; Does the Lorentz Transformation Reduce to the Galilean Transformation:
Two Myths about Special Relativity

[Moth]

Looking back over these posts, I realise that we are not discussing, just arguing. And we're not even arguing about the important parts. So I think I'll leave it there.

[corvidus]

Looking back over these posts, I realise that we are not discussing, just arguing. And we're not even arguing about the important parts. So I think I'll leave it there.

I see it more as people feeling towards a better explaination of their own opinions

Also, Rayn, thanks for taking the time to answer my curiosity (even if it has been awhile since)

[LoneWolf]

So you basically are argueing that some phenomena and the description of it holded in the mind of some people can't be expressed with big words?

You pick a definition from a single individual and argue that the object he is describing extends the definition or in other words,(and, since you are talking math) that there exists at least one element from the object which is not contained in the definition.

Magick being by some people some force or mechanism of existence and obviously,from our limited perspective, no more than a subjective set of experiences and phenomena, saying that any given try at a formal description can be critisiced and overthrown by any other individual claming that his subjective experience of such phenomena is greater or a superset of the other man's description, is in my honest opinion, remarkablely absurd and feat of an imbecile. It is pretty obvious already.

[Nahemah]

What Lonewolf said x 1000.

This member had some unusual ideas, coupled with a singular inability to accept discussion and criticism of those ideas.

[the_spiral]

This thread is a blast from the past. I backed out quickly once I realized the person had no interest in a dialogue around the points he raised but just wanted to deliver a lecture. This is what happens when people read widely but not deeply. So many words to say so little.